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Turkey is the only founding member of the OECD that has not converged to the US in
terms of per-capita GDP since 1950: its real GDP per capita is stuck at 20% of that of the US.
At a proximate level, we show that Turkey's relative stagnation over the past 50 years is due
to: (1) the relative decline in its labor force participation, and (2) the relative stagnation of its
TFP. We argue that the ¯rst fact is due to policies of high personal income taxation, and high
social security contributions for both employees and employers. The second fact we argue is due
to price support policies in agriculture, which distorted the allocation of resources in favor of
agriculture, thereby delayed the process of the structural transformation. We develop a dynamic
general equilibrium model with agricultural and non{agricultural sectors. The production of
the non{agricultural good can take place in the market or the household sector. We show the
extent to which these policies can account quantitatively for Turkey's relative stagnation.
JEL Classi¯cation Codes: O41; J21; O52.
1 Introduction
Since 1950s, Turkey has experienced a stagnation in its relative economic performance. Using
real GDP per capita as a measure of performance, Turkey has not managed to catch up to the
industrial leader, the United States. The ratio of Turkish per{capita GDP to the U.S. per{
capita GDP was 20% in 1950, and stayed at that level since then. Even though Turkey has
maintained its income relative to the United States, in the second half of the 20th century,
it has lost ground relative to countries in the European Union and the OECD. During this
period Turkey has been part of Western international organizations, has adopted Western
institutions, has had a market oriented economy, and has been a secular and democratic
state. Yet, Turkey has failed to catch up relative to the economic leaders and has been
outperformed by countries that had the same relative position as Turkey in the world income
1distribution in 1950 (see ??). Furthermore, Turkey is the only founding member of the OECD
that has not improved its relative economic position. This discrepancy between reasonable
expectations and actual performance is what makes Turkey an interesting case study of
relative stagnation.
A number of hypotheses have been proposed for Turkey's relative under-performance:
oil price shocks in 1970s, persistently high in°ation rates between mid 1970s and 2000,
foreign exchange crises, natural disasters, and recurrent political instability (see Yeldan,
1998). While each one of these may have some merit for a part of Turkey's recent history
none can account for the continuous lack of convergence of Turkey's per{capita GDP to that
of the world's industrial leaders.
In this paper, we document the relative stagnation of Turkey and we investigate its
proximate and fundamental causes, under the prism of the neoclassical tradition. First,
we ask what the proximate sources of Turkey's relative stagnation are. To answer this
question, we decompose per capita income into three components: physical capital intensity,
labor force participation and total factor productivity (TFP). We ¯nd that physical capital
accumulation has been strong, and therefore, is not the source of Turkey's relative stagnation.
Instead we ¯nd that since 1950, Turkey has experienced a dramatic decline in labor force
participation, both in absolute terms and relative to that in the United States. In addition,
Turkey's TFP growth did not catch up relative to the US. We conclude that any explanation
about why Turkey has not strengthened its relative economic position, should account for
the dramatic decline in the relative labor force participation rate and the relative stagnation
of its TFP.
Poor economic performance is not unique to Turkey. As Cole et al. (2005) argue, no Latin
American country has made any signi¯cant progress in catching up to the United States since
1950. They report that stagnant TFP is the key determinant of relative stagnation, while
labor force participation rate stayed constant, and did not contribute to the stagnation in
living standards in Latin America. In contrast, as this growth accounting exercise above
unveils, the unique feature of Turkish economic relative under{performance is the sharp
decline in labor force participation rates during the same time span, a signi¯cant contribution
to the relative sluggishness in economic growth.
Second, we delve further into the underlying reasons behind the the proximate causes
of Turkey's relative stagnation. We show that the structure of Turkey's economy di®ers
markedly from those of all other OECD countries, with Turkey having by far the highest
share of economic activity in agriculture, both in terms of employment and GDP share.
The data indicate that Turkey has been slow in moving resources, especially labor, out of
agriculture. Furthermore, the resources that have moved out of agriculture have not fully
found their way to the market sector, as evidenced by the continuous decline in labor force
2participation rates. We conclude that understanding Turkey's low labor force participation
and low TFP, one has to understand why Turkey has not reallocated labor into the market
non-agricultural sector at a faster rate.
Third, we argue that economic policies followed by Turkish governments since 1950 can
explain why resources have remained for so long in agriculture and why the resources that
left the agricultural sector withdrew from the market economy all together. The three main
sets of policies we emphasize are: (1) high subsidization of agricultural products, (2) high
e®ective tax rate on labor, (3) high e®ective tax rate on (non{agricultural) employers (which
includes labor market restrictions). Even though Turkey is not the only OECD country with
large subsidies to agriculture, it is the only OECD country with such a large agricultural
sector. We argue that subsidization of agriculture can delay the structural transformation if
it is pursued before a su±cient amount of resources have moved out of agriculture. Notice
that the second policy interacts with the ¯rst one by decreasing the incentives to supply
labor in the non{agricultural market. Finally, the third policy distorts the incentives to hire
labor, exacerbating the second policy in the labor market.
To assess the quantitative e®ects of these policies for Turkey's under{performance, we
develop a model of the structural transformation with household production, in which non-
agricultural output can be produced either in the market or the household sector.
The focus of this paper is on the relative, not the absolute performance of Turkey. See
for example, Prescott (2002), and Cole, Ohanian, Riascos, Schmitz (2004).
The structural transformation refers to the reallocation of economic activity from agri-
culture, to industry and then to services, as described by Kuznets, Chenery, etc.
There are generally two classes of models used to generate a structural transformation:
(1) non-homothetic preferences with the income elasticity of agricultural goods being less
than one and greater than one for services: Laitner, Echevarria, Kongsamut Rebelo and
Xie. This preference structure will deliver a structural transformation even with neutral
technological progress. (2) di®erent rates of technological progress, with the fastest growth
in agriculture and the slowest in services: Baumol, Ngai and Pissarides, Acemoglu and
Guttieri. With this approach you can generate a structural transformation with homothetic
preferences as long as the elasticity of substitution between goods is not unity.
We opt for the ¯rst approach. This is motivated by the results in Ngai and Pissarides
(2005) who ¯nd that uneven technological progress cannot account for the re-allocation of
economic activity away from agriculture.
According to Schi® and Valdes (1998) developing countries usually tax agriculture and
developed countries usually favor agriculture. In this sense Turkey is unique, because it is
one of the few countries that has favored agriculture so much before undergoing a structural
transformation.
32 Turkey's Relative Economic Position
In this section we document Turkey's performance relative to the United States, and other
major countries, over the period 1950-2000. The main measure of economic performance we
use is real GDP per capita from the Penn World Table (Mark 6.1).
Turkey started o® with low income per capita in 1950 and has not improved its position
relative to the United States in the second half of the twentieth century. In 1950, Turkey's
real GDP per capita was 20% that of the United States. In 2000, Turkey still had only
20% of the US income per capita. Furthermore, Turkey has lost ground relative to the
European Union of 12,1 especially over the period 1950 { 1980. In Figure 1, we document
the stagnation of Turkey relative to the United States and its falling behind relative to the
European Union.
Turkey was one of the founding members of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation
and Development (OECD) in 1961.2 The OECD is considered a forum of relatively rich
nations, which share similar political and economic institutions. One of its objectives has
been to promote and further the prosperity of its member countries. As Figure 2 indicates,
the OECD has managed, overall, to succeed in this goal since it has exhibited considerable
convergence relative to the United States in the second half of the 20th century. Turkey
is the only founding member that has not shown any sign of convergence over this period.
Figure 2 plots income relative to the US, for Turkey, the OECD, the EU, and a group of
South East Asian Economies (Japan, Korea, Taiwan). The most dramatic improvement in
living standards has been displayed by the average of Japan, Korea, Taiwan: they started
o® from 18% of US income in 1950, and reached 58% by 2000. What is noteworthy, is that
these countries had an average income that was almost the same as Turkey's in 1950.
In Figure 3, we plot relative real GDP per capita for the OECD countries that had a
similar income level as Turkey in 1950. All these countries have managed to improve their
relative position over the second half of the 20th century. All these countries managed to
perform better than Turkey, with the exception of Mexico. Mexico however did not join the
OECD until 1994, and therefore did not share the same burden of expectation as Turkey.
Even though much has been written about Mexico's falling behind, very little has been
written about Turkey. Out of the countries in Figure 3, we take three to be Turkey's closest
1The European Union of 12 consists of the countries that had joined by 1986: Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom. We note here,
that the predecessor of the European Union, the European Economic Community, was not established until
1958, and several members joined much later.
2The other founding members were, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
United States.
4peer group: Greece, Portugal, Spain. The performance of these countries is an indicator
about what Turkey's performance could have been, but is not. Even though the country of
reference, relative to which we assess the performance of Turkey, is the US, we will compare
Turkey to Greece, Portugal and Spain, whenever possible.
Next, as a ¯rst step to evaluating the sources of Turkey's stagnant relative income, we
decompose output per capita (Y=N) into two components: output per working age person {










This decomposition would attribute Turkey's relative stagnation to either low real GDP
per working age person relative to the US or low share of working age persons in the total
population relative to the US. Since the PWT do not report data on working age population,
we complement the PWT with data from the OECD, which start in 1960. Figure 4 displays
relative GDP per capita and its decomposition into working age population and share of
working age population. Figure 4, clearly shows that Turkey's relative stagnation comes from
its output per working age person. In fact, Turkish Y=N15¡64 has exhibited a deterioration
relative to the US in the past 40 years: it dropped from 24% in 1960 to 20% in 2000. We
conclude that the focus of our investigation should be understanding Turkey's relative real
GDP per working age person.
3 Aggregate Growth Accounting
First, we investigate the proximate causes of Turkey's relative stagnation at the aggregate
level. We also compare Turkey's relative performance to that of Greece, Portugal and Spain,
which we take to be a close peer group of countries. The results indicate that the source of
Turkey's under{performance is not under{accumulation of capital but instead the decline in
the labor force participation rate and the relative stagnation of Turkish TFP at a very low
level.
3.1 Aggregate Framework






where, for each country i at time t, Yit is real GDP, Kit is the capital stock, Lit is the
economically active population, and Ait is TFP. We assume that TFP is the product of two
5terms3: Ait = ¼itAt. We interpret At as the world technological frontier, which is common
across all nations, and ¼it as the idiosyncratic component of productivity which is country
speci¯c. 0 < ¼it · 1 indicates how close a country is to the frontier.
Using (1) and denoting total population in country i at time t by Nit, we decompose












where Yit=Nit is output per capita, Kit=Yit is capital intensity, and Lit=Nit is the labor
force participation rate.
In what follows we interpret the behavior of the TFP term in the US as re°ecting the
behavior of the technological frontier. In other words, we assume that ¼USt = 1 for all t.
3.2 Growth Accounting Results
The data used for this decomposition come from the PWT 6.1. More details on the data
used are provided in the Appendix. In Tables 1, 2, and 3 we provide the average annual
growth rates by decade of output per capita, the capital intensity factor, the labor force
participation factor, and the TFP factor for Turkey, the US and the ratio of Turkey over the
US over the period 1950-2000. Figure 6 displays the time-series decomposition of Turkey's
relative income into the capital factor, the labor force factor and the TFP factor.
Over the second half of the 20th century Turkish income did not exhibit almost any
catching up to the US: real GDP per capita in the US grew at an annual average rate of
2.3% while in Turkey the corresponding number was 2.69%. The ¯rst column in Tables 1,
2 and 3 provide the average annual growth rates of Turkish real GDP per capita, US real
GDP per capita and their ratio, by decade. The high growth rate in the decade 1950-1960
for Turkey is accounted for by a large jump in income in the ¯rst two years. As a ¯rst
approximation we are interested in uncovering the sources of the relative constancy of living
standards in Turkey over the post-war period.
The second column of each table contains the contribution of the capital intensity fac-
tor to real income growth, the third column contains the contribution of the labor force
participation rate and the fourth column contains the contribution of the TFP factor.
Table1: Accounting for Turkish Growth of Real GDP per Capita
3Here we follow, Parente and Prescott (2004) and Cole, Ohanian, Riascos and Schmitz (2004).
6growth rate of growth rate of growth rate of labor growth rate of
income per capita capital intensity factor force participation TFP factor
1950 -1960 4.04% 2.13% -1.22% 3.13%
1960 -1970 3.02% 1.29% -1.10% 2.84%
1970 -1980 1.67% 2.20% -0.57% 0.06%
1980 -1990 3.00% -0.33% 0.09% 3.25%
1990 -2000 1.76% 1.81% 0.36% -0.41%
1950 -2000 2.69% 1.41% -0.49% 1.76%
The post-war period was one of considerable capital deepening in Turkey, especially until
the 1980s. In fact, as Table 3 and Figure 6 reveal Turkey achieved considerable cathing up
relative to the US, in capital accumulation.
Turkish TFP grew at an average annual rate of 1.76% over 1950-2000. However, the US
TFP grew even higher, at an average annual rate of 1.81%. E®ectively the country speci¯c
component of technology for Turkey, ¼TURt, was not only low - 20% of the US - but remained
at roughly the same level over the entire period.
Table 2: Accounting for U.S. Growth of Real GDP per Capita
growth rate of growth rate of growth rate of labor growth rate of
income per capita capital intensity factor force participation TFP factor
1950 -1960 1.38% -0.47% -0.55% 2.42%
1960 -1970 2.91% -0.33% 0.49% 2.74%
1970 -1980 2.70% 0.46% 1.27% 0.94%
1980 -1990 2.18% 0.53% 0.17% 1.46%
1990 -2000 2.32% 0.32% 0.50% 1.50%
1950 -2000 2.30% 0.10% 0.37% 1.81%
The growth accounting exercise indicates that the main reason for Turkey's relative stag-
nation in living standards lies in the decline in its relative labor force participation: -0.86%
per annum. Tables 1 and 2 reveal that the relative labor force participation in Turkey
declined because fewer Turks started participating in the Turkish labor force and more
Americans participated in the US labor force. As Figure 6 indicates the drop in the relative
labor force participation was dramatic until the 1980s, while it °attened out a bit after that.
Table 3: Accounting for the Growth of Real GDP per Capita in Turkey Relative to the US
7growth rate of growth rate of growth rate of labor growth rate of
income per capita capital intensity factor force participation TFP factor
1950 -1960 2.63% 2.62% -0.68% 0.69%
1960 -1970 0.10% 1.62% -1.58% 0.09%
1970 -1980 -1.00% 1.73% -1.82% -0.88%
1980 -1990 0.81% -0.86% -0.08% 1.76%
1990 -2000 -0.55% 1.48% -0.13% -1.88%
1950 -2000 0.39% 1.31% -0.86% -0.05%
In fact, as is clear from Fig.4 and Table 1, Turkish real GDP per worker has been catching
up to the US since over the period in question it has been increasing relative to the US at
an annual rate of 0.9%. This is still low however compared to Turkey's peer group which
managed to achieve considerable catchup over the post-war period in real GDP per worker.
3.3 Comparison to Peer Group
We conduct growth accounting decompositions for the three countries which we take to
belong to Turkey's peer group in 1950: Greece, Portugal, Spain. In Figures 7-10 we plot
the evolution of real GDP per capita, the labor force participation rate, the capital intensity
factor, the TFP factor relative to the US, for Turkey and its peers.
All these countries who were to later join the OECD, started from approximately the
same level of living standards, around 20% of US living standards in 1950. 50 years later,
the three of them - Greece, Portugal, Spain - managed to raise their income relative to the
US bringing it closer to 50% of the US one. Turkey on the other hand remained at 20% after
¯ve decades. See Fig.7.
Fig. 8 indicates that the capital intensity increased at roughly the same rate in all four
countries, although Turkey started o® at a lower level than its peer group. Therefore, this
factor is not to blame for Turkey's relative stagnation.
Fig.9 reveals that the labor force participation rate declined in the Greece, Portugal and
Spain relative to the US. However, the decline in Turkey's relative participation rate was
much more dramatic than in its peer group, being particularly emphatic until the 1980s.
All four countries converged to a participation rate of around 80% of the US one. Thus,
Turkey's relative decline has to do with the fact that Turkey started o® with an unusually
high relative participation rate.
Finally, Fig. 10 shows that Greece, Portugal and Spain achieved considerable catching-
up in TFP relative to the US while Turkey did not. Turkey remained at around 40% of US
8TFP while its peer group achieved TFP levels of 60%-70% of the US ones, even though the
departure point was similar in 1950.
3.4 Could it be Human Capital?
Does the relative stagnation of TFP have to with human capital di®erences? Need data
at the aggregate level on human capital for Turkey and the US. If not very di®erent: Our
analysis suggest that the source of Turkey's relative stagnation does not lie in lack of physical
or human capital accumulation. The contrary. Our analysis suggests that to understand the
relative stagnation in Turkey's living standards we must understand why the labor force
participation rate dropped so dramatically and why TFP did not gain any ground relative
to the US over a period of half a century.
Table 4: Average Years of Schooling
(relative to the US)
Greece Portugal Spain Turkey
1950 0.47 0.13
1960 0.54 0.22 0.42 0.23
1965 0.54 0.24 0.41 0.22
1970 0.53 0.25 0.48 0.22
1975 0.57 0.28 0.45 0.23
1980 0.55 0.27 0.43 0.24
1985 0.59 0.30 0.45 0.29
1990 0.64 0.36 0.51 0.33
1995 0.66 0.37 0.54 0.38
2000 0.69 0.40 0.59 0.39
Source: Barro-Lee (2000)
It would be good if we can get Bils and Klenow (2000) measures of human capital and
the Manuelli and Sheshardi (2004) quality adjusted measures of human capital, to complete
our argument that it is not human capital di®erences.
The aggregate analysis indicates that if we want to understand why Turkey did not
manage to catch up at all to US living standards we have to understand: (1) why did so
many people drop out or failed to enter the Turkish labor force in the post-war era, and (2)
Why didn't Turkey manage to improve its country-speci¯c productivity component over this
period. This is our task for the remainder of this paper.
94 Labor Market Dynamics
4.1 Overall Employment
We emphasize the decline in persons employed/participating rather than hours worked
because these do not seem to vary systematically across countries. See Fig.10, where the
relative annual hours worked per person employed have fairly constant for Turkey and its
peer group fo countries over the past 50 years and at relative par with the hours worked in
the US over this period.
Using data from the OECD Labor Market Statistics we calculate over the period 1960-
2002: (1) the labor force participation as the fraction of persons participating in the labor
force in the total working age population (aged 15-64), (2) the employment rate as the total
number of persons employed over the total population aged 15-64, (3) the civilian labor force
participation rate (excludes armed forces), (4) the civilian employment rate (excludes armed
forces). In Fig.11 we report these aggregate labor market statistics for Turkey relative to
the US values. What is clear is that all the above relative measures decreased, both because
the absolute measures declined in Turkey and increased in the US.
In Turkey, the civilian labor force participation rate declined from 85% in 1960 to 51%
by 2003! In the United States on the other hand, labor force participation increased from
65% in 1960 to 75% in 2003. Over the same period, labor input as measured by the civilian
employment rate declined in Turkey from 77% to 46% and increased in the US from 62% to
71%. In fact the labor force participation rate and the employment rate moved almost one for
one in both countries. Consequently in order to understand why labor force participation
declined so dramatically both in absolute and relative terms we have to understand why
Turks dropped massively out of the formal market economy, i.e., why labor input declined.
Two natural questions emerge: (1) Which activities are not being performed?, (2) Which
individuals that were working before are unwilling to work now in the market sector?
To answer the ¯rst question we use OECD data for the period 1960-2002 to calculate
sectoral employment rates for the three broad sectors, agriculture, industry, services. We
measure the sectoral employment rate as the total civilian employment in a given sector
over the total working age population between 15-64 years old. Fig.12 plots the sectoral
employment rates for Turkey. We observe a dramatic decline in the labor input in agriculture
over the period: the fraction of working age persons employed in agriculture dropped from
60% in 1960 to 16.5% in 2002. What is remarkable however is that the loss of labor input
in agriculture did not translate into a gain of labor input in industry or services. The
employment rate in industry and services increased by only 2% and 6% respectively. Thus a
very large part of the Turkish working age population dropped out of the market agricultural
10sector without being re-allocated to the market sector of industry or services.
In Fig.13 we plot the Turkish relative employment rates by sector relative to the US ones
for the period 1960-2002. If Turkey was catching up to the US over the period 1960-2002 we
would expect the relative employment rates in agriculture and industry to decline and that
in services to increase. This would be consistent with the Kuznets stylized facts about the
structural transformation which accompanies the process of a country's development.
In the 1950s more Turks worked in the market sector than Americans but today Amer-
icans work more in market activities than Turks. There has been a large change in the
relative labor supply over the past ¯fty years. We believe that di®erences in labor supply
between Turkey and the US can be accounted to a large degree by di®erences in the e®ective
marginal tax rate on labor income.
There are three factors, the combination of which, we identify as being important in
understanding the low employment rate and labor force participation in Turkey:
² High income taxation.
² High Social Security contributions.
² Tight labor market regulations {especially high minimum wages{.
These factors which we identify by the stand-in e®ective tax on labor ¿ induce people to
work in the informal sector instead of the market sector.
Given that people work in the informal sector it is better for them to work in the rural
sector, because home production is more productive in rural vs. in urban areas.
Labor market distortions labor out of market activity and into household production.
The additional e®ect is that these distortions induce people to stay in the rural area, where
they devote much of their time to home production. The intuition is that, conditional on
spending more time in the non-market sector, individuals would prefer to be in the rural
area because household production opportunities are better there.
We can also show that subsidies to agriculture prevent people from moving out of the
agricultural sector, and provided they stay in agriculture the informal sector is better because
of the high distortionary labor policies.
Personal income tax + employee social security contributions.
4.2 Informal Employment
The informal sector includes wage earners and the self{employed who do not pay income
taxes, are not covered by a social security program, and are not subject to other employment
regulations.
11Social security coverage for civil employees is provided by the Retirement Fund (ES). The
Social Security Organizations (SSK), which was established in 1964, provides coverage for
workers at state owned enterprises and private sector employees. Both ES and SSK provide
health bene¯ts and retirement bene¯ts. Bagkur provides health and retirement bene¯ts for
the self employed in Turkey.
The size of uncovered employment is still a large part of the labor force in Turkey although
it has been declining over time.
Tansel (2000) using individual level survey data from the 1994 Turkish Household Ex-
penditure Survey of the State Institute of Statistics in Turkey reports that 34% of male wage
earners and 35% of female wage earners do not have social security coverage and thus work in
the informal sector. This is consistent with the evidence in Bulutay (1997) who reports that
35% of wage earners are not under social security coverage, based on data from Household
Labor Force Survey of April 1996. Tansel (1997) reports that 42% of self employed men and
82% of self employed women have no social security coverage according to the 1989 Labor
Force Survey. According to Turkish census data the proportion of self{employed males de-
clined from 44% in 1955 to about 31% in 1990, while the proportion of wage earner males
increased from 21% in 1955 to about 50% in 1950.
5 Policies
5.1 Tax and Social Security Policies
According to the OECD one of the priorities for the Turkish economy is to reduce the tax
wedge on labor income: \Social security contribution rates are among the highest in OECD
and create a vicious cycle encouraging unregistered activities, which already account for more
than half of all employment and contribute to the steady decline in recorded participation
rates" (OECD,...).
5.2 Labor Market Policies
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) is one of the main reasons cited by employers for
avoiding hiring in the o±cial registered economy.
5.2.1 Severance Pay
Severance pay is introduced in Turkey ¯rst in 1936. Over time it has been changed several
times, mostly, in favor of employees. The ¯rst legislation in 1936 restricted the severance
pay to those who worked for ¯ve years. For each year of tenure, the employee was eligible
12for a severance pay of regular pay of 15 days. In 1950, the eligibility requirements have been
made less strict. The minimum tenure of the employee was reduced to three years from ¯ve
years. In 1967, bene¯ciaries became eligible to receive severance pay in the event of the
employee's death. In 1975, the minimum tenure was reduced from three years to one year.
In addition, the severance pay is doubled by increasing the regular pay factor from 15 to 30.
For the ¯rst time, it has introduced a maximum level of severance pay which amounted to
7.5 times the regular pay of 30 days.4
5.3 Agricultural Policies
According to Schi® and Valdes (1998) developed countries subsidize agriculture and develop-
ing countries tax agriculture. Even though Turkey was not a developed country it pursued
policies that subsidized agriculture heavily, going back to the 1950s.
Agricultural policies that subsidize farmers and the agricultural sector as a whole involve
market price supports, direct transfer payments, subsidization of input use, and general ser-
vices to the sector. Since 1987 the OECD has been systematically organizing monetary trans-
fers to agriculture constructing four main indicators: (1) Producer Support Estimate (PSE),
(2) Consumer Support Estimate (CSE), (3) General Services Support Estimate (GSSE), and
(4) Total Support Estimate (TSE). These indicators measure transfers from consumers or
taxpayers to farmers, arising from agricultural policies. The PSE measures the total value
of gross transfers at the farm gate, from consumers and taxpayers to support agricultural
producers. The PSE includes the Market Price Support (MPS) which measures transfers
arising from policy measures that create a gap between domestic market prices and bor-
der prices. PSE also includes transfers from taxpayers to farmers in the form of payments
based on, output, area planted or animal numbers, historical entitlements, input use, input
constraints, overall farming income, and miscellaneous payments. CSE is an indicator of
the gross transfer to (from) consumers of agricultural commodtities, measured at the farm
gate level. The CSE includes transfers to producers from consumers, other transfers from
consumers, transfers to consumers from taxpayers, excess feed cost. If negative the CSE
measures the burden on consumers by agricultural policies, from higher prices and consumer
charges or subsidies that lower prices to consumers. GSSE measures the gross transfers to
general services provided to agriculture collectively and not individually to farmers. These
include research and development, agricultural training, inspection services, infrastructures,
marketing and promotion, public stockholding. TSE measures the value of all explicit and
implicit gross transfers from taxpayers and consumers to agriculture net of associated bud-
4The Supreme Court has annulled this upper bound on severance pay. Later, the Military government in
1980 has reintroduced this maximum.
13getary receipts (import receipts).
OECD countries in general provide high levels of support to agriculture, although there
are large di®erences in the overall level and the composition of agricultural policies across
member countries. Table 1 compares PSE and CSE as shares of gross farm receipts5, over
the periods 1986-88 and 2001-03, for a number of OECD countries. The CSE as a percent-
age, measures the implicit tax (or subsidy, if CSE is positive) on consumers as a share of
consumption expenditure at the farm gate. A glance at these numbers suggests that Turkey
did not subsidize agriculture as much as other OECD countries over the past 20 years. Fig.1
and Fig.2 indicate that for almost every year since 1986 Turkey has had PSE and CSE shares
that were lower than the OECD averages.
These numbers however are misleading regarding the subsidization of agriculture because
they do not include the general services provided by the government to farm sector. TSE as
a percentage of GDP measures the overall transfers to agriculture including general services.
Taking such services into account, Turkey is the country with the highest rate of agricultural
protection in the OECD today. This is illustrated in Fig.3, which compares TSE as a share of
GDP between periods 1986-88 and 2002-04, for a number of OECD countries. Fig.4 indicates
that the overall subsidization of agriculture in Turkey has been considerably higher than the
OECD average in every year since 1986. Caveat: these numbers are high in Turkey because
the share of agriculture in total GDP and employment is very high.
We believe that TSE as a percentage of GDP is the relevant measure of farm support for
our purpose. Although it is important to distinguish between transfers to farmers and general
service transfers, we are concerned with the overall protection that agricultural policies
impart on the farm sector as a whole, and how these policies a®ect the decision of an
individual to remain in agriculture vs. non{agriculture.
The overall level of support in the OECD has not changed much over a 20 year period
but the composition has: with a movement towards less distorting forms of support. For
example, there has been a decline in the price support transfers and transfers linked to output
and input use and an increase in budgetary transfers for general services to the agricultural
sector (see Table 2).
Agriculture has long been a net receiver in Turkey. Transfers from consumers to farmers
came through support purchases of major crops backed by high import tari®s.
Turkish governments pursued protective trade policies for major crops, government pro-
curement, input subsidies, subsidized credit to farmers through the Agricultural Bank (in
5PSE and CSE are calculated in the same currency for all countries (usually US dollars or euros). Conse-
quently any movements over time in these measures could re°ect both movements in policy and/or exchange
rates. Expressing them as a percentage of gross farm receipts (also expressed in a common currency) elimi-
nates the exchange rate e®ects.
14many cases without pay back in due time).
6 Model
In this section we develop a model of the structural transformation and introduce policy
frictions to rationalize the relative stagnation of Turkey's economy over the period 1950-2000.
The model is closely related to those in Echevarria (1995, 1997), Kongsamut, Rebelo and
Xie (2001), Caselli and Coleman (2001), and Rogerson (2004). Similar to these papers, non-
homothetic preferences and technological progress deliver a structural transformation over
time, with a shift of resources from agriculture to non-agriculture. Unlike these authors:
(1) we allow for the possibility that nonagricultural goods can be produced either in the
market sector or the household sector, and (2) we emphasize particular policy frictions that
are capable of altering the process of the structural transformation.
6.1 Environment
Consider an economy with two consumption goods, agricultural and non-agricultural, and
three factors of production, capital, labor and arable land (used only for the production of the
agricultural good). The non-agricultural good can be produced either in the market sector
or the home production sector. Output produced in the home sector is directly consumed
by households and household members occupied in household production are not subject to
government tax and social security policies. Our modelling of the household sector is similar
to Greenwood, Rogerson, Wright (1995), Parente, Rogerson and Wright (2001), and Gollin,
Parente, Rogerson (2004).
In our model, we do not emphasize policies that discourage capital accumulation. Instead
we put structure on policies that inhibit the movement of labor from agriculture to non-
agriculture and policies that a®ect the return to working in the market vs. the household
sector. The policies we introduce are the ones that the data have led us to suspect are
important for understanding Turkey's relative stagnation. For this reason there are no taxes
on consumption expenditures, investment expenditures, or capital income.
Preferences The economy is populated by a large number of identical, in¯nitely-lived
households with log-linear preferences over sequences of agricultural consumption, non-




t f½log(at ¡ a) + (1 ¡ ½)logct + ÁlogltgNt (2)
15where at is per capita consumption of the agricultural good, ct is an index of per capita
consumption of the non-agricultural good, and lt is per capita leisure, all at time t. The
share of the agricultural good in the household's consumption basket is determined by the
parameter ½ 2 (0;1). The parameter Á > 0 speci¯es the value of leisure for the household.
The presence of the subsistence term a ¸ 0 makes these preferences non-homothetic, and
implies that the income elasticity with respect to agricultural goods is less than one6. This
preference structure along with exogenous technological progress is capable of producing a
structural transformation.
Non-agricultural consumption is an aggregate of market (cmt) and non-market consump-
tion (cht), described by the CES aggregator,
ct = [¹c
"





In the CES aggregator, ¹ measures the relative importance of market and home goods
in the non-agricultural consumption basket, and " determines the elasticity of substitution,
1=(1 ¡ "), between goods produced in the market and home sectors.
The total amount of time available to a household is normalized to one. The amount of
time devoted to business activities is the sum of the time devoted to agricultural production
and the time devoted to market non-agricultural production
nbt = nat + nmt (4)
Leisure is the amount of time remaining after a household member has worked in the
business sectors (nbt) and the non-market sector (nht)
lt = 1 ¡ nbt ¡ nht (5)
The population is assumed to grow exogenously at a rate ´¡1. With an initial population
level of N0 the population dynamics are described by Nt = N0´t. Households own the capital
and the arable land, both of which they rent out to the ¯rms. Households are initially
endowed with K0 units of capital and Ta units of arable land.
Production Technologies The agricultural good is produced solely in the business sector.
The non-agricultural good can be produced either in the market (business) sector or in the
household sector. Work time devoted to the household sector is not subject to any form of
taxation.
6This means that as the consumer's income rises she will consume a disproportionate amount of non-
agricultural goods. This is simply Engel's law. If a = 0, then as income rises the consumer would increase
her consumption of both the agricultural and the non-agricultural goods proportionately.
16The agricultural good is produced according to a production function that exhibits con-











where the TFP term Aat grows exogenously at a rate °a ¡ 1, and hence with an initial level
of agricultural TFP of Aa, its dynamics are described by Aat = Aa°t
a. The parameters ®,
Ã 2 (0;1) determine the shares of the three factors in the production of the agricultural
good.
The market non-agricultural good is produced according to the following constant returns






where the TFP factor Amt grows exogenously at a rate °m ¡ 1 and Amt = Am°t
m.






where h denotes output and factor inputs used in the home sector. Notice that we allow the
labor compensation shares to di®er across the market and non-market technologies, with the
non-market technology being more labor intensive, ¾ < µ. TFP in the non-market sector
grows exogenously at rate °h ¡ 1.
Policies We emphasize two kinds of policies: (1) policies that distort the allocation of
labor input between the business and the non-market sectors, (2) policies that distort the
allocation of resources between agriculture and non-agriculture. In particular we assume
that time devoted to the business sectors is taxed at a rate of ¿et < 1 for every dollar of real
wage earned. The tax ¿et re°ects what the employee pays out of her labor income in personal
income taxes and employee social security contributions. Firms are also assumed to incur
costs when hiring labor. These costs involve employer social security contributions and other
labor costs associated with labor market restrictions on hiring and ¯ring. We denote the
additional labor costs for the ¯rm by the stand-in tax ¿ft < 1 for every dollar paid in net real
wages. Denoting the real wage rate paid per unit of time devoted to the business sectors by
wt the overall labor cost accruing to the ¯rm is wt (1 + ¿ft). Consequently, the total wedge
between what the ¯rm pays and the employee receives is equal to
wt(1+¿ft)
wt(1¡¿et) = (1+¿ft)
(1¡¿et) . We will
denote this wedge by (1 + ¿t) ´ (1+¿ft)
(1¡¿et) . Finally, agricultural ¯rms receive a subsidy st < 1
per unit of output. This subsidy re°ects price support levels determined by the government
for agricultural products. The consumer and the producer price of food will di®er by the
size of the subsidy.
17Resource constraints The economy's total capital stock, Kt, is perfectly mobile at a
given point in time and is allocated across the business sector technologies and the home
non-agricultural technology,
Kt = Kbt + Kht (7)
Business capital, which consists of the capital allocated to the agricultural sector and the
market non-agricultural sector, is given by
Kbt = Kat + Kmt (8)
Business capital depreciates geometrically at a rate ±b, and the law of motion governing
this capital stock is,
Kbt+1 = (1 ¡ ±b)Kbt + Xbt (9)
where Xbt is business capital investment at time t.
Home capital depreciates geometrically at the rate ±h. The capital accumulation equation
for home capital is,
Kht+1 = (1 ¡ ±h)Kht + Xht (10)
where Xht is home capital investment at time t.
At any point in time, labor input is allocated across the business and home technologies
and leisure,
Nt = Nat + Nmt + Ntnht + Ntlt (11)
The agricultural good can only be used for consumption purposes,
atNt = Yat (12)
The market non-agricultural good can be used for consumption or investment purposes,
cmtNt + Xbt + Xht = Ymt (13)
The government is assumed to balance its budget from the policy activities each period.
Any excess revenues are returned to consumers in a lump-sum fashion (if there is excess
spending, consumers are taxed lump-sum),
TRt = (¿et + ¿ft)wtnbt ¡ stptYat (14)
6.2 Equilibrium
We let the market non-agricultural good be the numeraire, and denote the relative price of
the agricultural good by pt.
18An equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of output and factor prices fpt, wt, rt,
qtg1
t=0, a sequence of policies f¿et, ¿ft, st, TRtg
1
t=0, a sequence of allocations for the ¯rms
fYat, Ymt, Kat, Kmt, Nat, Nmt, Tag1
t=0, a sequence of allocations for the household fat, cmt,
cht, nat, nmt, nht, lt, Khtg1
t=0, such that (1) given prices and policies, fat, cmt, cht, nat, nmt,
nht, lt, Khtg1
t=0 solves the household problem, (2) factor prices are competitive, (3) markets
clear, (4) the government satis¯es its period by period budget constraint.
Household Optimization The household faces a labor - leisure decision, a consumption -
savings decision, and a sectoral allocation decision. The household's date t budget constraint
is,
[ptat + cmt]Nt + Xbt + Xht = rtKbt + wt (1 ¡ ¿et)nbtNt + qtTa + TRt (15)
where wt is the real wage rate paid in the business sector, rt is the rental price of capital, qt
is the rental price of land, and TRt are lump sum transfers/taxes to the stand-in household.
The household maximizes (2), subject to (3), (5),(6),(9),(10), and (15).
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The ¯rst condition says that in equilibrium the ratio of marginal utilities between the
agricultural and non-agricultural market goods is equalized to the relative price ratio. The
second equation says that household members will allocate their time to the market sector
until the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is equal to the real
wage rate: at the margin the consumer is indi®erent between working a bit more in the market
and taking a bit more leisure. The third equation says that household members will work
in the home sector until the marginal rate of substitution between home consumption and
leisure is equal to the marginal rate of transformation between home production and leisure.
The fourth equation suggests that the marginal cost in terms of utility, from sacri¯cing one
unit of consumption today should be equal to the present discounted utility bene¯t of extra
19consumption tomorrow. The last equation says that the utility cost sacri¯cing one unit of
market consumption today should be equal to the discounted future utility bene¯t of more
market and household consumption.
Firm Optimization The representative ¯rm in each sector solves a sequence of static
problems at each date: the ¯rm chooses the factor inputs it will hire to maximize pro¯ts,
taking prices and government policy as given. Capital and labor can move across all three
sectors, while arable land can be used only in the agricultural sector.























mt ¡ wt (1 + ¿ft)Nmt ¡ rtKmt
ª
The mobility of labor and capital across the two technologies in the business sector implies
that in equilibrium the net returns to these factors must be equalized. Consequently capital










Balanced Growth Path Equilibrium A balanced growth path equilibrium is an equi-
librium as de¯ned above with the property that aggregate variables grow at constant rates.
The existence of a balanced growth path with a constant real interest rate and a constant










In this balanced growth path equilibrium, aggregate output and capital variables fYmt,
Yat, Kmt , Kat, Kht, Ktg and the rental price of land qt, grow at rate °
1
1¡µ
m ´ ¡ 1, per capita
variables fcmt, cht, atg and the wage rate wt grow at rate °
1
1¡µ
m ¡1, and labor input variables
fNmt, Nat, Ntnhtg grow at rate ´¡1. The rental price of capital rt, the relative output price
pt, and per capita leisure lt are constant along the balanced growth path.
Asymptotically the economy will converge to this balanced growth path. It is useful to
transform all growing variables by dividing them with their growth factors along the balanced
20growth path. We denote the transformed variables by hats, for example Kt is transformed





. The labor inputs Nit for i 2 fa;mg are transformed to nit =
Nit
Nt .




m ¯¡1 ¡ 1 + ±b. Along with the ¯rst order condition with respect to the capital input









m ¡ ¯ (1 ¡ ±b)
! 1
1¡µ
We solve for the values of the other variables in the steady state numerically, due to the
non-linearities in the model.
Transitional Dynamics The following set of equations fully describes the dynamics of
the transformed economy. These relationships will hold at all points in time, including the
balanced growth path.
The ¯rst order conditions to the household's problem in terms of the transformed variables
can be written as,
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The equalization of net wages across sectors in equilibrium, allows to solve for the relative
prices of the agricultural market good, the agricultural non-market good, and the non-
agricultural non-market good, in terms of the capital labor ratio in the non-agricultural












































where I have also used (16) to substitute the capital labor ratios in all other sectors with
that in the non-agricultural market sector which is our numeraire.
Since arable land can be used to produce agricultural goods either in the formal or
the informal sector, in equilibrium the rental price of land must be equal across sectors.
Exploiting this relationship along with land market clearing we get the following condition
























Market clearing for the non-agricultural good produced in the formal sector produces,









The requirement that the agricultural goods (market and non-market) and the non-





















































Finally capital and labor market clearing, along with (16) produces the ¯nal equation

















In the quantitative section we solve for transitions to the balanced growth path numeri-
cally.
22E®ects of Policies The personal income taxes and the employee social security contribu-
tions a®ect the household's supply of labor to the market sector, while the social security
contributions by the employer, a®ect the demand for labor by the ¯rms.
7 Quantitative Analysis
7.1 Calibration
We parameterize the model so that it matches data for the US economy and key features of
its structural transformation over the period 1950 - 2000.
We normalize the intital population level, initial arable land and the initial TFPs in
all sectors to one for the US economy in 1950, N0 = Ta = Am = Ah = Aa = 1. These
normalizations correspond to a choice of units.
We choose the population growth rate ´¡1 to match an average annual population growth
rate of 1.2% over the period 1950-2000 as calculated from the POP series in PWT6.1.
We choose the weight of farm goods in the household's consumption basket, ½, to match
an average share of farm value in total consumption expenditures of 0.035 over the period
1990-95. This is because in a balanced growth path equilibrium ½ = pb a=(pb a + b c). From the
Economic Report of the President, the average over 1990-95 of the share of food expenditures
in total consumption expenditures is 0.16. From the USDA the share of farm value in total
consumer expenditures on food is only 0.22 (average over 1990-95). The product of the two
numbers gives us the value of ½.
We set the parameter ², that determines the elasticity of substitution between goods
produced in the market and at home, up front. Micro and macro studies ¯nd this parameter
to be between 0.4-0.45 (see for example). Following Rogerson (2005) we set this parameter
equal to 0.45, which implies a fairly large degree of substitutability between market and
home goods.
The average annual growth rate of US real GDP per hour (or worker) over the post war
period is 2%. In terms of the model this implies °
1
1¡µ
m = 1:02 and given a value for µ, the
growth rate of TFP in the market non-agricultural sector, °m, is determined.
In the model there are two types of capital, business capital and household capital.
Business capital includes capital allocated to both the agricultural and the market non-
agricultural sector. We need to allign our targets in the NIPA with the variables in our model.
We take household investment to include only expenditures on consumer durables. Business
investment consists of residential expenditures, non-residential expenditures (structures and
producer durables), changes in inventories, and 25% of government expenditures. Household
capital is the stock of consumer durables, and business capital is the sum of residential capital,
23non-residential capital and government capital. The investment variables are calculated from
NIPA as averages over the period 1950-2000. The capital variables are the 1990 stocks from
Musgrave (1997).
We choose the depreciation rate of business capital, ±b = 0:044, to match a target for
the business investment to capital ratio of b xb=b kb = 0:076, as calculated above. We set the
depreciation rate of household capital, ±h, equal to ±b.
The share of capital in the market non-agricultural technology, µ, is set to 0.31 to match a
target for the capital to output ratio in the market non-agricultural sector of b km=b ym = 2:83.
Non-agricultural market capital is calculated as the 1990 stock of business capital as de-
scribed above minus the 1990 stock of non-residential farm capital. Market non-agricultural
output is calculated as the product of GDP from NIPA and one minus the share of farm
output in GDP. The share of farm output in GDP is calculated from the Industry Accounts
of the BEA.
We set the subjective discount factor, ¯, equal to 0.9577 to match an asymptotic real
interest rate of R = 6:5% (see Siegel (1995)). On the balanced growth path, the Euler
equation implies that ¯ = °
1
1¡µ
m =(1 + R), where R = r ¡ ±b.
The share of capital (reproducible and non-reproducible) in the agricultural technology,
Ã is chosen to match the labor compensation share for agriculture. The agricultural labor
compensation share is calculated as compensation of employees over agricultural value added
minus indirect taxes and non-tax liability. It is calculated from the benchmark data (use
tables) of the US Input-Output Tables, as the simple average of the 1987, 1992 and 1997
tables (weighted averages delivered similar results). The share of reproducible capital in total
capital in agriculture, ®, is chosen to match the fraction of the total rental cost of capital that
goes to non-reproducible capital (land), 0.4754, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(see Caselli and Coleman (2001)). This number implies an income elasticity with respect to
land of 0.31 which is within the range of values obtained from cross-country estimation of
agricultural production functions (0.1-0.4). See for example Hayami and Ruttan (1985).
We set the labor income tax rate ¿e, in the balanced growth path, equal to 0.4 in accor-
dance with the calculations of Prescott (2004) for the period 1993-96. Assuming that there
are no labor market restrictions in the US, we set the employer tax rate equal to 0.07, which
are the social security contributions paid by the employer as a fraction of the total labor
costs (OECD, 1998). We set the subsidy to agriculture s equal to 0.18, which is the average
producer support estimate as a share of farmer income, reported for the US economy by the
OECD over the period 1990-2000.
Time use studies for the US ¯nd that households devote 25% of their total time to
home production activities and 33% of their time to market activities. These two numbers
determine two targets in the context of our model: nh = 0:25 and nb = 0:33. The ratio of
24normalized total hours in agriculture over normalized total hours in market non-agriculture,
na=nm, is equal to the ratio of hours worked per employee in agriculture over market non-
agriculture times the ratio of employment rates in agriculture over market non-agriculture.
The ratio of hours worked per employee in agriculture vs. market non-agriculture has a
exhibited a downward trend in the past 50 years in the US: it declined from 1.34 in 1950 to
1.04 in the 1990s (average of 1990-97). The ratio of employment rates declined from 0.135
in 1950 to 0.029 in the 1990s. This implies that the ratio of total hours in agriculture vs.
market non-agriculture, na=nm in our model, declined from (1:34)(0:135) = 0:18 in 1950 to
(1:04)(0:029) = 0:03016 in 1990-97. This occured both because the ratio of hours declined
and because the ratio of employment rates declined. If nb has remained roughly constant over
the post-war period then the above numbers imply that the allocation of total business hours
in 1950 was na;1950 = 0:0504 and nm;1950 = 0:2796 while over 1990-97 it was na;1990s = 0:0097
and nm;1990s = 0:3203.
The share of capital in the home production technology ¾, the share of market produced
goods in the non-agricultural consumption basket ¹, and the weight of leisure in the house-
hold's utility Á, are chosen to match three targets in the balanced growth path: the share
of home capital to market non-agricultural output b kh=b ym = 0:32, the fraction of hours in
home production nh = 0:25, and the fraction of hours in market non-agricultural production
nm = 0:3203. These targets imply values for ¾, ¹, and Á of 0.1035, 0.64, 0.425 respectively.
Finally we choose the parameter a = 0:17 to match the fraction of total hours in agricul-
ture in 1950.
7.2 The Experiment
The experiment we do is the following. We ask whether the di®erences in taxes and subsidies
between the US and Turkey can account for the relative stagnation of Turkish economy over
the post war period. In particular we ask how much of the relative stagnation can we account
for with exogenous di®erences in taxes, subsidies equal to the ones we see in the data.
We want ¿f to capture all forms of government regulation, interference, or any other
institutional disincentive to hire labor in the market sector, not only direct employer contri-
butions.
8 Discussion
The next natural question is whether the drop in labor force participation is concentrated
among a speci¯c group of the population. This may inform policy analysis.
One question we have not explored is: which subgroup of the population is not working?
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A Data Description
PWT 6.1 The following variables have been obtained from the PWT 6.1. POP: Popula-
tion (the source is the WDI 2001 and the UN Development Center). RGDPCH: Real GDP
per capita (Constant price: Chain series). RGDPWOK: Real GDP per worker (Constant
price: Chain series), where workers refer to the economically active population (according
to the ILO de¯nition). KI: Constant price share of investment in real GDP. We calculate
real GDP as RGDPCH£POP and the real investment series as real GDP£KI. The labor
force participation rate is calculated as RGDPCH/RGDPWOK. The capital stock series are
calculated using the a law of motion with geometric depreciation, as follows:
Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + Xt
where Xt is the real investment series calculated above. For a given depreciation rate ± and
initial condition for the capital stock K0, the above equation can be used to generate the
capital stock series for the entire period. Following Caselli (2004) we set ± = 0:06 and we
calculate the initial condition for the capital stock series as K0 = X0=(± + gX), where X0
is the value of the investment series in the ¯rst sample year, and gX is the average annual
growth rate of the investment series for each country between the ¯rst sample year and 1970.
26OECD Corporate Data Environment, Labor Market Statistics From this OECD
publication we have obtained the following variables. Population between 15-64: working
age population. Labor Force: economically active population (employed and unemployed).
Civilian Labor Force: labor force minus armed forces. Employment: employed persons based
on ILO de¯nition. Civilian Employment: employed persons except for those in armed forces.
Groningen Growth and Development Centre Annual Hours worked per person em-
ployed.
References
Bils, M., and Klenow, P., 2000. \Does Schooling Cause Growth?" American Economic
Review 90, 1160-1183.
Cole, H., Ohanian, L., Riascos, A., and Schmitz, J., 2005. \Latin America in the Rearview
Mirror." Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 69-107.
De Soto, H. 1990. The Other Path. New York, NY. Harper and Row.
Djankov, S., La Porta R., Lopez-De-Silanes F., Shleifer, A. 2002. \The Regulation of Entry."
Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 1-37.
Manuelli, R., and Seshadri, A., 2005. \Human Capital and Wealth of Nations." University
of Wisconsin, working paper.
Prescott, E., 2004. \Why Do Americans Work So Much More Than Europeans?" Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 28, 2-13.
Yeldan, A Erinc., 1998. \On structural sources of the 1994 Turkish crisis: A CGE modelling
analysis," International Review of Applied Economics 12, 397-414.
27B Figures











































Figure 1: Turkey's Relative Real GDP per capita

























































Figure 2: Relative Real GDP per capita: Turkey and Groups of Countries




























































Figure 3: Relative Real GDP per capita: Turkey and OECD Countries





































Figure 4: Decomposition of Turkish Real GDP per Capita
30